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NOTES
Federal Money Laundering
Crimes-Should Direct Tracing of
Funds Be Required?
BY JOSEPH R. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
D irty Money. This phrase has long been used to describe criminals'
ill-gotten gains. Defining this term has also become a necessity for
our federal courts. In the last four decades, organized crime and the drug
trade have frequently provided the impetus for the creation of new federal
crimes. They certainly provided the motivation for Congress when it
enacted the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (the "Act").1 The Act
contains two substantive criminal provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 1956, entitled
"Laundering of monetary instruments,"2 and § 1957, entitled "Engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity."3
The substantive money laundering crimes quickly became a favorite of
federal prosecutors--one former federal prosecutor commented: "MOVE
OVER RICO. The white collar crime of the 1990s is here and it is Money
J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.
118 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000). See generally Jimmy Gurul6, The Money
Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or Merely
Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified
UnlawfulActivity?, 32 AM. CRiM.L. REV. 823 (1995) (outlining and explaining the
legislative history and political forces which influenced the Act); Andy Pasztor,
White House Proposes Tough Measure In Its Battle Against Money Laundering,
WALL ST. J., June 14,1985, at 5 (reporting on the Reagan Administration's money
laundering proposals).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
3 ld § 1957.
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Laundering."'4 The frequent use of the money laundering statutes in
criminal prosecutions can be attributed to their relative simplicity, breadth,
and the harsh forfeiture and sentencing consequences that result from
conviction.5
The frequent usage of these statutes has spawned a commensurate
amount of case law. Other white collar cases have required federal courts
to analyze complex fact patterns and novel concepts in the criminal arena.6
This Note analyzes one of these concepts--the notion of criminal "pro-
ceeds" in the context of money laundering. This concept is crucially
important to the money laundering laws. Specifically, this Note analyzes
the dilemma of commingled funds, focusing primarily on two questions.
When "dirty money" is commingled in an account with "clean money" and
funds are subsequently withdrawn, is the money coming out clean or dirty?
Must prosecutors trace the withdrawn funds to the dirty money that was
originally deposited in order to obtain a money laundering conviction? The
concept of "proceeds," while relatively new to the criminal law, has been
dealt with in detail in the commercial law tradition.8 Surprisingly, courts
have rarely looked to the commercial law analog in defining the scope of
criminal proceeds.9
Part I of this Note briefly outlines the substantive offenses.'" Part II
explains how the federal courts have (not always uniformly) addressed the
issue of commingled funds in the context of money laundering." Part III
analyzes the courts' decisions and reasoning in light of the purposes of
these statutes and a commercial law tradition which, long before money
laundering was a federal crime, had addressed the issue of proceeds and
4 Elkan Abramowitz, Money Laundering: The New RICO?, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 1,
1992, at 3 [hereinafter Abramowitz, Money Laundering].
5Id
6 See, e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-62
(2d Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. All Funds
Presently on Deposit at Am. Express Bank, 832 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(applying accounting rules in order to determine whether monies in fire bank
accounts were "proceeds traceable" to narcotics sales).
7 See generally 2 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, FORFEiTURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO §
18.1 (1998) (explaining that dirty money is money generated illegally or generated
legally and made dirty through tax evasion).
'See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
9See discussion infra Part III.B.
,oSee discussion infra Part I.
"See discussion infra Part II.
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had developed tracing rules.'2 Part IV concludes that the federal circuit
courts of appeals have generally come to the correct conclusions on tracing,
but that protections are needed to ensure that these (necessarily) broad
statutes are used appropriately. 3
I. MONEY LAUNDERING: THE SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSES
To gain an understanding of the commingling problem, it is important
to first describe the basic elements of the money laundering crimes.
4
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Laundering of Monetary Instruments
Section 1956 is the basic, and most frequently used, money laundering
statute. It contains three subsections which criminalize three types of
criminal activity: § 1956(a)(1) covers domestic financial transactions;
subsection (a)(2) deals with international money laundering; 6 and
subsection (a)(3)was draftedto include government sting operations.1 7 This
Note addresses only the subsection (aX1) crimes. 8
S2See discussion infra Part III.
'3 See discussion infra Part IV.
This brief outline of the substantive offenses, while necessary to introduce
the commingling issue, does not address many complex issues raised by these
criminal statutes that have been addressed by the federal courts. Nearly every term
in the statutes has been litigated, including constitutional "void for vagueness"
challenges. See infra note 39. This is symptomatic of a broad statute used to
prosecute sophisticated criminals always on the lookout for new ways to conceal
the nature of their activity and make itmore profitable. Seegenerally Gurul6,supra
note 1, at 828 ("Applying the MLCA [Money Laundering Control Act] has
confounded the courts."). For an excellent explication of all elements of the
substantive money laundering crimes, see Sixteenth Survey of White Collar Crime:
Money Laundering, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1051 (2001) [hereinafter Survey of
White Collar Crime].
1s 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000).
16 Id § 1956(aX2).
'71d § 1956(aX3).
8 Section 1956(a)(1) punishes offenders by imprisonment for up to twenty
years and a substantial fine for a defendant who:
[Knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity-
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful
2001-20021
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The essential elements of subsection (a)(1) crimes are: (i) The defend-
ant must "conduct;" (ii) a "financial transaction;" (iii) the proceeds
involved in the transaction must be "in fact the proceeds of a specified
unlawful activity;" and (iv) the defendant must act with the requisite mens
rea.'9 Section 1956(a)(1) can be further subdivided into four categories:
(AXi)---the promotion provision; (A)(ii)--the tax evasion provision;
(BXi)--the concealment provision; and (BXii)-the reporting requirement
provision. 0 All four provisions of § 1956(a)(1) share the element that the
defendant must act "knowing that the property involved in a financial
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity."'
B. 18 US.C. § 1957. Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property
Derived From Specified Unlawful Activity
Section 1957, the companion statute to § 1956, punishes offenders by
subjecting them to up to ten years imprisonment and levying a fine against
anyone who "knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000
and is derived from specified unlawful activity." Section 1957's essential
elements are: The defendant must (i) "knowingly;" (ii) "engage" in; (iii) a
"monetary transaction;" (iv) in "criminally derived property of a value
greater than $10,000." One can immediately see that § 1957 does not
contain the detailed mens rea requirements present in § 1956.24 Indeed, §
activity; or
(ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation' of
section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or
(B)knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part-
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or
Federal law ....
Id § 1956(a)(1).
19 2 WELLING ET AL., supra note 7, § 18.14.
20 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1956. The § 1956(a)(1) crimes are known as "transaction
money laundering!' since it is the financial transaction itself that is the crime.
Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 14, at 1054.
21 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (emphasis added).
2 Id § 1957.23 d.
24 d § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)-(B)(ii).
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1957's only mens rea requirement is that the "financial transaction" be
conducted "knowingly"--absent is any mens rea to conceal funds, evade
income taxes, et cetera.' This has led some to characterize § 1957 as a
strict liability offense because all that is required to violate § 1957 is to
engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property.26
C. Commingled Proceeds
There would be no interpretive problem in the tracing context if the
account at a financial institution contained exclusively dirty money, butthis
is frequently not the case. Dirty money (i.e., "proceeds of specified
unlawful activity" as used in § 195627 and "criminally derived property" as
used in § 1957,28 hereinafter referred to collectively as "proceeds") is
frequently commingled in accounts with clean funds. When a withdrawal
is made from the account, should the presumption be that the funds coming
out are clean or that they are dirty? Defendants have frequently challenged
their convictions under §§ 1956 and 1957, arguing that the government
rendered insufficient evidence by failing to trace funds leaving the account
to the unlawful activity.29 These challenges have framed the issue for
federal courts. °
25 1ld § 1957.
' See infra notes 62-77 and accompanying text for an analysis of the strict
liability nature of § 1957.
27 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
2aId § 1957(a).
29 ee, e.g., United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1483, different results
reached on reh'g, 88 F.3d 897, 897-98 (10th Cir. 1996) (conviction reversed
because evidence offinancial statements ofcodefendantwere admitted in violation
of Fifth Amendment).
30 It is very clear, however, that in order to obtain a conviction under either of
the money laundering statutes, the government need not prove that proceeds were
both deposited and withdrawn. The deposit itself can be charged as a crime under
either statute as the provisions of both statutes define the "transaction" requirement
to include a deposit at a financial institution. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3); iad §
1957(t)(1); see, e.g., United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1292 (9th Cir.
1997). However, it is easy to see that both a deposit and a withdrawal would, other
things being equal, lend more weight to a prosecutor's argument that a defendant
intended to launder funds. The issue really boils down to whether funds withdrawn
from a commingled account are presumed dirty. See infra notes 31-81 and accom-
panying text.
2001-2002]
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II. COMMINGLED FUNDS IN MONEY LAUNDERING CASES:
THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. Prosecutions Under § 1956
The bulk of federal money laundering charges are brought under §
1956."' Consequently, this statute has spawned more case law than its
counterpart, § 1957. The following cases give prototypical examples of the
commingling issue and demonstrate how the federal courts have addressed
it.
In United States v. Jackson, three defendants were convicted of
conspiring to distribute cocaine. 2 One of the defendants, the Reverend
Joseph Davis, was also convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise and money laundering based on § 1956(a)?3 Davis' church and
its "development corporation" each maintained checking accounts ata local
savings and loan?4 Davis had authority to write checks on both accounts.35
The government introduced evidence at trial that Davis deposited funds
into these accounts that he obtained from presiding over a crack cocaine
business.36 Funds derived from other, "legitimate," sources were also
deposited into the accounts 7 Davis wrote out some checks to cash for
personal use, wrote some to the order of vendors who provided beepers and
cell phones, bought several automobiles, and wrote out other checks to his
landlord. 8
On appeal, Davis made numerous challenges to his convictions. 9
Amongst these included the argument that there was insufficient evidence
to allow the jury to convict him of laundering funds from his narcotics
operations. ° He argued that there were other sources of income deposited
3 1 NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 397 (3d ed. 2000).32 United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
33 Id at 837.
34 Id at 836.
351 Id at 837.
36 See id.
37 Id
3 8 Id
" One of Davis's arguments was that § 1956(aX1) violated his right to due
process because it was impermissibly vague. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded thatthe statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Davis. See
id at 838.40 Id at 839.
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in the checking accounts and that "no rational juror could decide beyond a
reasonable doubt that the individual checks and transactions enumerated in
[the money laundering] counts... of the indictment involved money
derived from drug activities."' 1
The government countered Davis' argument using the testimony of an
internal revenue agent. The agent testified at trial that Davis earned
$102,500 from non-drug sources during the relevant period, while over
$200,000 was deposited in the two accounts. 2 The government argued that,
given the other evidence presented at trial, the jury could have reasonably
inferred that the difference in these amounts was attributable to the
narcotics operation.43 Furthermore, the government also argued that the
statute did not require direct tracing-it was enough to show that some of
the money came from the unlawful activities." The Seventh Circuit agreed
with this argument and held in favor of the government.
4
Relying on the statutory language contained in § 1956, the court
reasoned that Congress's use of the word "involve" showed that the
government was not required to trace the origin of all funds going into a
bank account to determine whether funds coming out were proceeds of a
specified unlawful activity.47 The court further concluded that Congress did
not intend to allow criminals to avoid money laundering convictions by
commingling funds.& " Finally, the court found that "the commingling in this
case is itself suggestive of a design to hide the source of ill-gotten gains
that the government must prove under § 1956(aX1)(BXi)." 9
Similarly in United States v. Bencs,5" the defendant was convicted of
"conspiring to defraud the United States, evading income tax, money
laundering, and structuring financial transactions to avoid cash reporting
4" Id Davis's "other sources of income" included "bird-dogging cars, arranging
purchase-money loans, and demolishing buildings." Id
42 Id at 839.
43 Id.
"Id at 839-40.45 See id at 840-41.
418 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added) ("Whoever, knowing that
the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction
which in fact involves the proceeds of specific unlawful activity.").47 Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840.
48 Id.
49 d
1o United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 1994).
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requirements."' Bencs challenged the adequacy of the evidence, claiming
that the government must trace the funds in the subject financial transac-
tions to specific criminal activity. 2 The Sixth Circuit, also relying on the
"involve" language in § 1956 and the Jackson court's interpretation, found
Bencs's argument unavailing. 3 The court affirmed Bencs' convictions
under the statute.'
Jackson and Bencs accurately represent other circuit courts' treatment
of this issue. Courts have looked to the "involve" language in the statute
and the broad remedial intent of the money laundering statute to hold that
requiring direct tracing is contrary to the statutory language and would
allow criminals to avoid conviction by commingling dirty money in
accounts with other funds." Commingling itself has been held to be
indicative of intent to launder funds.56 No circuit has required the govern-
ment to directly trace proceeds to specified unlawful activity in a § 1956
case." Therefore, one can easily see why this is the statute of choice in
money laundering cases.
One may legitimately conclude that the relative ease with which the
government can prove the "proceeds" portion of its case is mitigated by the
detailed mens rea requirements of§ 1956." Itwould seem that involvement
in criminal activity would provide an adequate basis to infer such a mens
5 See id at 557.
1
2 1d at 561-62.
531 d. at 562.
4 Id
5 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (1lth Cir. 2000)
(holding that requiring the government to "trace the origins of the funds and
ascertain'exactly which funds were used for what transaction' "is unnecessary and
contrary to congressional intent); United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1131
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the government need only prove "at least part of the
money [in the deposit account] represented such proceeds" to justify conviction
under § 1956); United States v. Hardwell, 80 F.3d 1471, 1483, different results
reached on reh'g, 88 F.3d 897, 897-98 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that the govern-
ment is not required "to trace the money to a particular illegal drug transaction" to
satisfy the statute); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding it "sufficient to prove that the funds in question came from an account in
which tainted proceeds were commingled with other funds").
56 United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991).
17 See Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 14, at 1063.
" The mens rea requirement of § 1956(a) is two-fold: the defendant must
"know" the property is dirty and must act with the requisite mens rea included in
the subcategory the defendant is charged with violating. 2 WELLING ET AL., supra
note 7, § 18.14.
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rea. The money laundering crimes were intended to address the specific
evils of money laundering in the context of drug dealing and organized
crime59-- not to provide a surrogate crime when, for example, federal
prosecutors feel that the predicate offense would not result in punishment
commensurate with the severity of the offense.' Furthermore, a defendant
need not be found guilty of the predicate crime (e.g., bank fraud, drug
dealing) in order to be found guilty of money laundering.6
B. Prosecutions Under § 1957
Unlike § 1956 prosecutions, the federal circuit courts of appeals are in
disagreement as to the commingling issue in § 1957 prosecutions.62 A
majority of circuits have held that the government is not required to trace
criminally derived funds in commingled accounts to prove that the subject
funds were derived from specified unlawful activity.63 Some of the circuits
have utilized the reasoning used in § 1956 cases to arrive at this result."
However, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Rutgard, held that direct
tracing is required.65
Jeffrey Rutgard was a physician convicted of mail fraud, false claims
to Medicare, and transactions in money derived from these predicate
crimes.' He was convicted of engaging in two transactions in money
derived from specified unlawful activity because his wife had made two
wire transfers to a bank on the Isle of Man from a trust account maintained
at a financial institution in San Diego.67 This account contained funds
derived from numerous deposits, including a deposit of municipal bonds,
all of which had their origin in his medical practice.6 The court, evaluating
the fraud convictions, determined that Rutgard's entire medical practice,
contrary to the government's theory, was not a fraud and that only certain
9 See Pasztor, supra note 1.
6o See generally Guruld, supra note 1.
61 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) (2000). The statute only requires the defendant to know
that the proceeds derive from or could derive from an unlawful activity. Id62 See Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 14, at 1063.
6 3See 2 WELLING ET AL., supra note 7, § 18.15.
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1994).65United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).
6Id at 1275.
67Id at 1290.
" Id
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deposits could be characterized as emanating from specified unlawful
activity.69 The trust account, therefore, contained commingled funds.7"
The Ninth Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of § 1957 and § 1956
in order to determine whether direct tracing is required.7 The court
described § 1957 as follows:
The description of the crime does not speak to the attempt to cleanse dirty
money by putting it in a clean form and so disguising it. This statute
applies to the most open, above-board transaction .... The intent to
commit a crime or the design of concealing criminal fiuits is eliminated.
These differences make a violation of § 1957 easier to prove. But also
eliminated are references to "the property involved" and the satisfaction
of the statute by a design that "in part" accomplishes the intended result.
These differences indicate that proof of violation of§ 1957 may be more
difficult.
It [§ 1957] is a powerful tool because it makes any dealing with a bank
potentially a trap for the drug dealer or any other defendant who has a
hoard of criminal cash derived from the specified crimes. If he makes a
"deposit, withdrawal, transfer or exchange" with this cash, he commits the
crime; he's forced to commit another felony if he wants to use a bank.
This draconian law, so powerful by its elimination of criminal intent,
freezes the proceeds of specific crimes out of the banking system .... A
type of regulatory crime has been created where criminal intent is not an
element .... Such a powerful instrument of criminal justice should not
be expanded by judicial invention or ingenuity. 72
This reasoning required the government to trace the funds in order to
sustain the § 1957 conviction in this particular case. The court gave several
examples of instances where the government could meet is burden of proof
without resorting to tracing.73 These examples include: if the defendant
withdrew all of the funds from the account74 or if there was a presumption
that once criminally derived property is deposited, any transfer out of the
account is presumed to be of tainted monies.75 Finally, since § 1957 speaks
69 See id
70 See id
1 Id at 1290-93.
2Id. at 1291-92 (citations omitted).
Id at 1292-93.
74See id at 1292.
71 Id at 1292-93. The court declined to adopt this theory, however, reasoning
that this would eviscerate the distinction between § 1956 and § 1957. See id
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to "financial transaction[s]," the government can charge the deposit itself
as a crime76 However, the fact that the transactions "involved" funds
obtained from specified unlawful activity alone was not sufficient.77
C. Comparison of§ 1956 and § 1957
The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Rutgard is persuasive in that it is based
on the plain meaning of the language in the statutes and of the different
terms that were used7 Since these statutes were enacted at the same time,
it seems wholly appropriate to interpret them together. Furthermore, the
paltry mens rea requirement in § 1957 obviously would cause judicial
reluctance to adopt an overly broad interpretation of that statute's terms. 9
If direct tracing is not required to convict under § 1957, essentially the
two statutes address the same type of prohibited activity, but the § 1957
crime is easier to prove than the § 1956 offense. In Rutgard, the Ninth
Circuit spoke about § 1957 as a crime that "freezes" criminal proceeds out
of the banking system." Perhaps § 1957 can best be viewed as a type of
prophylactic measure, albeit one that carries harsh sanctions. The fact that
§ 1956 carries a stiffer penalty than § 1957 may also demonstrate that
Congress viewed these crimes differently.8'
The substantive money laundering crimes are not, however, the only
context in which tracing is relevant. The courts have also had to grapple
with this dilemma in forfeiture cases.
D. Criminal and Civil Forfeiture
Other federal statutes dealing with the commingling issue are the
federal forfeiture statutes.' Cases construing these statutes have also re-
76 See id at 1292.
7 See id at 1292-93.78 See id at 1290-93.
79 But see John D. Cline, Ninth Cir. Requires Tracing Under Sec. 1957, Causes
Conflict, 7 MONEYLAUNDERNGL.REP. I (May 1997) (arguing that the differences
in the two statutes identified by the Ninth Circuit do not justify different tracing
rules and that tracing should also be required under § 1956).
10 Rutgard, 116 F.3d at 1291.
81 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2000) (providing for up to a twenty-year
prison sentence) with § 1957(b)(1) (providing for up to a ten-year prison sentence).
12 Id § 981 (general civil forfeiture); id § 982 (general criminal forfeiture); id
§ 1963 (RICO forfeiture); 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000) (criminal drug forfeiture); id. §
881 (civil drug forfeiture). While there are numerous criminal and civil forfeiture
2001-20021
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
quired federal courts to analyze the issue of commingled proceeds. The
forfeiture statutes contain different language relating to proceeds than that
contained in §§ 1956 and 1957 and have resulted in some differing
interpretations as to what constitutes "proceeds" in the context of commin-
gled accounts.83
One of the cases involving this analysis is United States v. Banco
Cafetero Panama." This case outlines some of the common factual
situations presented in civil forfeiture in the context of monies maintained
at financial institutions. A civil forfeiture action was brought by the
government based upon the theory that funds maintained by a bank in the
United States were derived from a criminal drug conspiracy headed by the
president of another foreign bank. 5 The bank argued that the subject funds
were insulated from forfeiture based on the realities of banking practice and
banking law: "Banks are not bailees of their depositors' money, and a
depositor may not replevy his money as a specific res or follow it into the
hands of another bank customer." 6 The bank further argued that for the
court to hold otherwise would impose burdens of investigation upon
banks.8 7 The court disagreed and held that the funds were forfeited.'
These civil forfeiture cases are to be distinguished from money
laundering prosecutions because the forfeiture statute makes reference to
statutes, they are similar in that the underlying activity that gives rise to forfeiture
is some offense defined by statute. For example, the federal civil forfeiture statutes
allow the government to bring an action to "forfeit" property associated with
certain criminal offenses. See Stefan D. Cassella, The Uniform Innocent Owner
Defense to Civil Asset Forfeiture: The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of2000
Creates a Uniform Innocent Owner Defense to Most Civil Forfeiture Cases Filed
by the Federal Government, 89 KY. L.J. 653, 654 n.1 (2001) (describing the
authority for civil asset forfeiture).
83 As to the analogy betweenmoney laundering and forfeiture law, see generally
G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 149,150-61 (1989) (identifying three separate bodies of law which influenced
the enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: conspiracy law,
forfeiture law, and the difficulties with enforcement of currency reporting
requirements).
" United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986),
superseded by statute as statedin United States v. All Funds Presently on Deposit
at Am. Express Bank, 832 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).81 Id at 1157.
"6Id at 1158.
871d
8Id at 1161.
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"proceeds traceable to... [a narcotics] exchange." 9 The Second Circuit,
in Banco Cafetero, first outlined three general situations where the tracing
problem comes up.
First, the court analyzed "[a]ccount[s] used [s]olely for [d]rug [p]ro-
ceeds."'  This relatively simple situation presents no real analytical
difficulty for courts. Even the defendants "grudgingly acknowledge[d]" that
these funds may be subject to forfeiture.9'
Second, the court analyzed "[a]ccount[s] [u]sed for [d]rug [piroceeds
and [o]ther [t]ransactions."' This situation presents the commingling
problem directly. The defendants, pursuant to their banking practice
argument, posited that these commingled funds should be free from risk of
forfeiture.93 The court looked to the legislative history of § 881 and
concluded that Congress intended the statute to encompass criminal
proceeds that are commingled with clean monies.'
The court proceeded to analyze three accounting theories which could
be used in these situations: (i) a "drugs-in, last-out rule" (essentially the
same as the "lowest intermediate balance rule" from trust and secured
transactions law); (ii) the "averaging" rule (essentially a pro-rata type
analysis); and (iii) a"drugs-in, first-out" rule. The government argued that
it was entitled to select from either the first or third approaches; the court
agreed.' Interestingly, however, the court wrote:
Which approach reflects reality in any particular case will depend on the
precise circumstances. For example, if a depositor placed a $175 check
from his automobile insurer in payment ofa damage claim into an account
that contained $100 from a drug sale and the next day paid a $175 bill for
car repairs, a fact-finder would be entitled to conclude that the $175
withdrawal did not contain "traceable proceeds" of the drug transaction
but solely the "traceable proceeds" of the insurance payment, with the
tainted deposit remaining in the accountY
8 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (2000).
9 Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d at 1158.
91 See id
9Id at 1158-61.
93See id at 1159.
94 See id
95 See id.
961d at 1158-59.
97 d. at 1160.
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Finally, the court analyzed the third scenario--"[a]ccount[s] [f]unded
at [a]nother [b]ank with [d]rug [p]roceeds."9 The court relied, primarily,
on congressional intent to reach monies exchanged through a series of
transactions.99 The court felt that "intervening" transactions did not permit
tainted monies to cease to be criminal proceeds."l°
The detailed approach taken by the court in Banco Cafetero stands
in stark contrast to the "involv[ing]" approach used by most courts in
§ 1956 and § 1957 prosecutions.' 0' One may legitimately wonder whether
Congress intended such disparate outcomes based on such small differences
in statutory language. 2
III. SHOULD DIRECT TRACING BE
REQUIRED IN MONEY LAUNDERING PROSECUTIONS?
"Proceeds of specified unlawful activity"'0 3 and "criminally derived
property"' 4 are relatively new concepts to the criminal law. The commer-
cial law tradition, however, has addressed the concept of proceeds at length
in the context of security interests and constructive trusts. For example,
assume that A, an automobile dealer, has obtained a bank loan in order to
finance his inventory of new cars from B, a commercial bank. B, in order
to reduce his exposure in the event of default, takes a security interest in the
inventory of new cars (the "collateral"). When A sells the cars to consum-
ers, cash is generated. Although B's security interest is limited to the cars,
98Md at 1161.
99 See id
100 Id
'' See discussion supra Parts II.A and H.B. The argument that the resort to
such techniques in forfeiture and criminal cases is inappropriate is not without
merit and, arguably, is supported by the plain meaning of the money laundering
criminal statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000). It would seem that if
Congress wished to provide for such techniques it would have done so in the
statutes.
102 The differing treatment of "proceeds" in the civil forfeiture context can also
be justified on the basis that civil forfeiture often involves collateral consequences
to third parties-an individual who receives tainted property subject to civil
forfeiture can have that property taken away unless she qualifies as an "innocent
owner." Proving that one is an innocent owner can involve substantial cost and
hardship. See generally Cassella, supra note 82.
103 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2000).
'04 Id. § 1957(f)(2).
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he retains a security interest in identifiable "proceeds" recognized upon the
disposition of the automobiles-i.e., he has a security interest in the cash.'05
If A deposits these funds into a segregated account, B's task is not
difficult in the event of default. However, ifA has deposited these monies
into an account containing other funds, B is in a much more difficult
position from a proof standpoint. Since B's security interest only covers
"identifiable" proceeds, he must trace the proceeds in order to prevail.°6
Courts have developed theories to use in this "tracing" context when the
proceeds have been commingled with other funds.'0 7 The general rule is
that"proceeds are'identifiable' ifthey can be traced in accordance with the
state law governing the transaction."'08
The commercial law's definition obviously would not be binding on
federal courts in criminal cases unless the criminal statute incorporated this
meaning, but it would seem to inform courts' analysis in the absence of
other authority." References to state law, at first blush, may seem to be
wholly inappropriate in federal criminal cases. Federal courts, however,
have looked to state commercial law in federal mail fraud cases to deter-
105 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (1999).
' See id; id. § 9-315(b)(2).
107 See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Blue
Island, 504 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1974) (using the commercial law principle of
identifiable proceeds in a security); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank
of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-26 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (using the lowest
intermediate balance approach).
108 Universal C.L T. Credit Corp., 358 F. Supp. at 324.
" See, e.g., Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306,312-13 (1896) (holding
that the federal crime of mail fraud reaches conduct that would not have come
within the common law definition of "false pretenses").The Court looked to
Congress's remedial intent in passing the mail fraud statute-holding that if the
mail fraud statute only encompassed common law fraud, it would have excluded
certain activity that Congress certainly intended to be prosecuted through this
statute. ld at 313. Cf Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), superseded
by statute as stated in United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an employee's misappropriation of confidential information
constituted fraud for purposes of the mail fraud statute). In Carpenter, the Court
relied, in part, on New York's common law notion that employees who owe a
fiduciary obligation to their employers are prohibited from disclosing confidential
information obtained inthe course of that relationship. Id. at 27-28. The Court also
cited the Restatement (Second) ofAgency in arriving at its conclusion. Id at 28.
Notwithstanding Durland, Carpenter seems to support the conclusion that federal
courts may look to commercial common law concepts to inform their analysis in
certain criminal cases.
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mine what constitutes "fraud" and what constitutes "property."° This type
of analysis can be justified on two grounds. First, did Congress intend to
incorporate the common law meaning of the commercial law terms into the
federal statute? Second, would a definition of, for example, "fraud,"
entirely divorced from the generally understood meaning, raise any
constitutional "void for vagueness" problems with the statute?
It does not appear that any defendant has made the argument that
Congress intended to incorporate any type of common law concept of
commingled proceeds in the money laundering statutes. They have usually
couched their arguments in terms of challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence.I' Furthermore, as applied, "void for vagueness" challenges to the
money laundering statutes have been unsuccessful in the particular cases
in which they were raised.' 2
A. The Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "UCC") is a compre-
hensive body ofcommercial law governing secured transactions." 3 Section
9-315 addresses a secured party's right to the proceeds realized upon the
disposition of secured collateral." 4 TheUCC explicitly addresses commin-
gled funds:
Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable
proceeds: ... (2) if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the
secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including
application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than
this article with respect to commingled property of the type involved." 5
"0 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25-28 and discussion supra note 109.
"'1 See, e.g., United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 1991).
",
2 See Jackson, 935 F.2d at 838-39.
".. See U.C.C. § 9-101 (1999).
, 4Md § 9-315(a)(2) ("[A] security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds
of collateral.").
... Id § 9-315(b)(2). The official comment elaborates:
[Subsectionb] indicates when proceeds commingled with other property are
identifiable proceeds and permits the use of whatever methods of tracing
other law permits with respect to the type of property involved. Among the
"equitable principles" whose use other law may permit is the "lowest
intermediate balance rule."
Id § 9-315 cmt. 3.
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As one would expect, the tracing of proceeds is a very difficult thing to
prove when funds become hopelessly commingled in bank accounts. To
resolve these situations, courts have resorted to legal fictions like the
"lowest intermediate balance rule."' '16 This principle comes from trust law
and could apply, for example, when a trustee dissipates trust monies that
have been commingled with other funds."7 Section 202, Commentj of the
Restatement of Trusts provides:
Effect of withdrawals and subsequent additions. Where the trustee
deposits in a single account in a bank trust funds and his individual funds,
and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so
withdrawn, and subsequently makes additional deposits of his individual
funds in the account, the beneficiary cannot ordinarily enforce an
equitable lien upon the deposit for a sum greater than the lowest interme-
diate balance of the deposit."
Illustration 20 to Commentj follows:
A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with
$1000 of his own in a bank. He draws out $1500 and dissipates it. He
later deposits $1000 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on
the account for $500, the lowest intermediate balance." 9
Application of these concepts is easier said than done. Cases where courts
have had to grapple with these concepts have necessitated detailed analysis
into the daily balances and disbursements made from accounts.'20 One
"16 See, e.g., United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d
Cir. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in United States v. All Funds Presently
on Deposit at Am. Express Bank, 832 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). But see
Richard L. Barnes, Tracing Comm ingled Proceeds: The Metamorphosis of Equity
Principles Into U.C.C. Doctrine, 51 U. PITr.L.REv. 281 (1990) (arguing that these
legal fictions are not appropriately used in the commercial law setting).
"' See generally Harris J. Diamond, Note, Tracing Cash Proceeds in Insol-
vency Proceedings Under RevisedArticle 9,9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 385,407-
10 (2001) (describing the use of the lowest intermediate balance rule in the
commercial law setting).
's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202 cmt. j (1959).
19 Id § 202 cmt. j., illus. 20.
0 See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville, 358
F. Supp. 317, 326-27 (1973).
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published opinion included a chart showing deposits, withdrawals, and the
daily balances in the account.1
Furthermore, unlike the money laundering situation, in the commercial
law monies can, in effect, cease to be identifiable proceeds if the account
is commingled to the point that there is no rational basis for segregating the
funds.' Furthermore, if a debtor bought property with proceeds, that
property is also proceeds, but from a proof standpoint, eventually a secured
creditor would be unable to meet the "identifiable" test.12
B. When Using the Commercial Law's Concept of Proceeds is
Appropriate
The commercial law serves functions that are very different from those
of the federal criminal laws. However, as federal crimes become increas-
ingly complex and continue to address white collar crime, it is essential that
courts have an analytical framework from which to work.24 With the
increasing use of the money laundering statutes in criminal prosecutions,'"
these issues will continue to arise.
121 Id.
'22 See U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2) (1999); id. cmt. 3.
'23 See id. cmt. 5, ex. 1.
124 Federal criminal law has evolved to confront sophisticated crime. This
increasing sophistication seems to favor the use of commercial law concepts to
inform analysis, particularly in white collar criminal cases. Many of these concepts
are entirely new to the criminal law and the statutes themselves provide only
minimal guidance. Courts have, generally, looked to the (presumed) common sense
intent of Congress to interpret these statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 37
F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress, in drafting the money laundering
statutes, did not intend for defendants to be able to avoid the sanction of the statute
by commingling funds."). This approach overlooks the existing body ofcommercial
law that is much more concrete but was developed in a much different context.
The money laundering statutes are paradigmatic of many federal criminal
statutes in that they were broadly written to effectuate broad, remedial goals. The
breadth of these statutes may allow prosecutors flexibility in individual cases.
However, this breadth also raises possibilities for abuse. Department of Justice
approval is not usually required in order for prosecutors to seek a money
laundering conviction, see Abramowitz, Money Laundering, supra note 4, and the
guidelines provided in the U.S. Attorneys Manual are broad and not binding. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS MANUAL 1-1 (1997). Therefore, the conse-
quences of being charged with money laundering depend entirely on the discretion
of the individual prosecutor.
121 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 31, at 397.
[VOL. 90
FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMES
Whether federal courts should use the commercial law's notion of
proceeds depends upon the objectives Congress had in enacting the statutes.
Insofar as they were attempting to freeze the assets of organized crime and
drug figures, the money laundering laws seem, in this instance, duplicative
of the existing criminal and civil forfeiture laws. 26 However, it seems clear
that Congress intended to paint with a broad brush; it was clearly attempt-
ing to write a broad and harsh law to combat organized crime and drug
dealing.'27 The money laundering laws achieve this (in. addition to
providing harsh sentences) by depriving the criminal of the fruits of his
crime, thereby making crime unprofitable and making the reinvestment of
criminal proceeds impossible.' This rationale does not support the
conclusion that federal courts should narrow their understanding of
"proceeds" through the use of commercial law precedents.
However, the popularity of the money laundering laws may indicate
that these draconian statutes are being used against not only the organized
criminal and large-scale drug dealer, but also against those who do not
present such a clear danger of future criminal involvement.129 Such a statute
seems most appropriately used against those who pursue crime "as a
business" or those who are laundering funds for others-not those whose
offenses happen to qualify them for a money laundering charge because of
the statutes' breadth, but who present no real risk of future criminal
activity. An expansive definition of criminal proceeds seems appropriate
where the Money Laundering Control Act's remedial purposes are being
served (i.e., when the statute is being used against those who are involved
in crime "as a business"). The clear intent of Congress is being furthered
in this situation.
See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
127 See generally Guruld, supra note 1, at 823-25 (discussing the legislative
history behind the Act). Gurul6 notes that Congress intended to cut off the
"lifeblood" of drug trafficking and organized crime, thwart the activities of
professional launderers (who tended to be professionals-accountants, lawyers,
bankers), and close a loophole in existing law. Idl
I'l See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2000); id. § 982(a)(1) (stating that a court"shall" order
a forfeiture if a person is convicted under § 1956).
129 Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, Essay, New and Continuing Challenges in the
Fight Against Money Laundering, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1543, 1544 (1997).
"[T]he massive scale of the drug trade and the threat it poses to our financial
system, elevates drug traffickers to a class of their own in the universe of criminals.
Organized drug cartels employ sophisticated laundering techniques developed, in
some cases, by Ivy League-educated financial wizards." Id.
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If these statutes are being used in a "piling on" manner against those
who have committed isolated acts of criminal activity, the intent of
Congress is not furthered by an overly expansive definition of "proceeds"
in the commingling context This situation merely constitutes enhanced
punishment for the underlying crime. One commentator has argued that, in
enacting the Act, Congress was intending to criminalize activity not already
covered by existing law.30 In situations where the predicate crimes do not
indicate a risk of future criminal involvement, the money laundering
statutes, presumably, would be used appropriately if the defendant actually
"laundered" the specific dirty money. In these contexts, tracing seems
appropriate where the defendant is being charged based on a pure "launder-
ing" theory.
One can, however, legitimately argue that drug dealing and organized
crime were not the only targets of these laws based on the statutory text
itself. Section 1956(c)(7)(D) lists the predicate crimes that can give rise to
criminal proceeds. The list is long and relates to numerous topics, some
wholly unrelated to drug dealing or organized crime as those terms are
generally understood. 3' A cursory review of these crimes and the fact that,
under existing law in many circuits § 1957 is a strict liability offense,
indicate that a huge number of crimes can give rise to a money laundering
charge. One should also remember that these crimes were enacted under the
heading "Money Laundering Control Acg'-not "An Act to Criminalize
Unlawful Activity that Involves Money." The list of predicate acts leads
one to wonder whether the money laundering crimes were also intended to
serve the purpose of providing a vehicle for criminal prosecution when the
government cannot, for some reason, charge or convict the defendant of the
underlying criminal activity which gave rise to the criminal proceeds.
IV. CONCLUSION
The broad definition of "proceeds" in the commingling context is
appropriate where Congress's remedial purposes are being served. Where
130 See Guru16, supra note 1, at 853 (arguing that the broad construction given
to statutory language in § 1956 can result in conviction for conduct already
punished under other criminal statutes).
13118 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(D)(2000). Section 1957(f)(3) incorporatesthepredi-
cate acts listed in § 1956(c)(7)(D). Id. § 1957(f)(3). These predicate acts include
destruction of aircraft espionage, bank fraud, copyright infringement, food stamp
fraud, and violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Id This list of predicate
acts looks very similar to that provided in the RICO statute. See id § 1961(1).
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there is no risk of future criminal involvement or where pure money
laundering is "in and of itself" the only crime, the commercial law analog
seems to point in the right direction. Adopting different rules of statutory
construction for different cases is completely unacceptable and, at least
under § 1956, not justified by the statutory language. Therefore, this
argument really becomes one about prosecutorial policy rather than about
the literal interpretation of these statutes.
No one can doubt the power that federal prosecutors possess in white
collar cases with the money laundering statutes in their arsenal. The
statutes' broad provisions and harsh sanctions have certainly leveled the
playing field in the continuing fight against those who, before 1986, had
somehow escaped prosecution by laundering their funds or those who were
allowed to reinvest ill-gotten gains in a continuing criminal business.'
Given the power of this weapon, one would hope that it is being used only
against those whom Congress had in mind when it enacted the
legislation.'
Given the circuit split on the § 1957 commingling issue'3 4 and con-
ceivable "void for vagueness" challenges to § 1956,' the money launder-
' See Elkan Abramowitz, The Times Are Changing for Money Laundering
Trials, 8 MoNEYLAUNDERINGL. REP. 1 (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter Abramowitz, The
Times Are Changing] (arguing that one reason for the decrease in the number of
white collar criminal trials because of guilty pleas is the threat of a money
laundering charge). The author states:
The mere threat of a money laundering charge-the ease with which it can
be applied and the disproportionately harsh sentences that these offenses
carry under the Sentencing Guidelines-creates an overwhelming pressure
for many white-collar defendants accused of relatively simple frauds to
plead guilty and avoid the heightened risks of trial.
Id
' There are commentators who feel that the money laundering statutes have
been used inappropriately from a policy standpoint. See Gurul6, supra note 1, at
853. On the other hand, if one views the job of the federal prosecutors as one to
charge a defendant with every crime of which he may be convicted, there is no
inappropriate use of these statutes. The broad language in many federal criminal
statutes and the policies in the U.S. Attorneys Manual, while not binding, show that
the prosecutors' job indeed entails a large degree of discretion. For a discussion of
how some federal decisions interpreting the money laundering laws "render
virtually every crime with a financial component an act of money laundering as
well," see Abramowitz, The Times Are Changing, supra note 132, at 3.
'
34 See Survey of White Collar Crime, supra note 14, at 1063.
'"See, e.g., United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 837 (7th Cir. 1991).
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ing statutes seem to be appropriate subjects for Supreme Court review.
Given the Supreme Court's decision in Durland,"6 it seems unlikely that
the Court would promulgate a strict standard of what constitutes "proceeds"
in the money laundering context. Some limit on the use of these statutes is
foreseeable, however, since an intent to launder funds need not be shown
for a conviction under § 1957.' The Internet and increased international
business activity will likely increase the need for prosecutors to use these
statutes to prosecute sophisticated criminal activity and will likely bring up
even more complicated commingling issues. A uniform tracing rule where
commingled proceeds are involved would provide a refreshing level of
uniformity.
Lastly, efforts should be made to treat the money laundering crimes as
the powerful weapons that they really are. The statutes' broad terms and
harsh sanctions make these laws similar to RICO, anotherpowerful weapon
used to prosecute those involved in the drug trade and organized crime.'38
RICO is viewed as the ultimate federal crime and Department of Justice
policies,justifiably, require detailed steps to be followed before charges are
brought. One of these steps is Department of Justice approval.'39 Some
formal review process should also be required for money laundering
prosecutions."4 This process would ensure that a money laundering charge
is not merely being used as enhanced punishment for the underlying crime,
and that the intent of the Money Laundering Control Act-to combat large-
scale drug dealing and organized crime-is being furthered through the use
of this device.
While one can envision many undesirable consequences that flow from
overly broad criminal statutes, we must keep in mind that this is exactly
what Congress intended when it enacted many of the crime-fighting
measures of the past three decades. The intent was to cover activity that
previously "fell through the cracks" of existing statutes.' The breadth in
'36 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
117 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2000).
138 Id §§ 1961-1968.
139 See Abramowitz, Money Laundering, supra note 4 (noting that Department
of Justice approval makes RICO less appealing to prosecutors since the enactment
of the money laundering statutes).
4' The number of instances of money laundering would render impractical a
process as detailed as that required for RICO. However, a number of procedures
short of formal Department of Justice approval could be developed to ensure
appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion.
141 See generally Guruld, supra note 1, at 823-25.
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these statutes gave prosecutors needed flexibility to charge offenders who
had an uncanny ability to stay one step ahead of the law.
The development of overly detailed tracing rules would, in some
instances, completely thwart this goal and turn a criminal trial into
something akin to an accounting shell game with each side calling expert
witnesses to describe how, based on an accounting theory or banking
practice, the funds that left the account could not have possibly been the
dirty money. It is completely natural, however, to want to see more
concrete evidence than thatthe funds merely "involved" criminal proceeds,
particularly in cases involving isolated acts of criminal activity. This is the
dilemma with the money laundering laws and, indeed, with most statutes
designed to facilitate prosecution of the most sophisticated criminals. The
resolution of this problem must necessarily lie with individual prosecutors.
No one should doubt the utility or necessity of the money laundering
laws. They serve the necessary purpose ofprosecuting those whose activity
allows criminal enterprises to flourish and makes detection less likely.
These purposes necessarily require a large degree of flexibility which, in
some individual instances, can lead to the inappropriate use of these
statutes. By providing some limitations on their use, the effectiveness of
these laws is not curtailed. Rather, it is assured that the true purposes of
these statutes are being served.
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